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Right—to—Work Laws and the Extent of Unionization
ABSTRACT
It is a well knownfactthat the extent of unionization is lower in
states with Right—to—Work (RTW) laws. A framework is developed for deter-
mining whether RTW laws actually cause a decrease in the extent of unioni-
zation or whether they simply mirror preexisting tastes of workers against
unions. A set of empirical tests is proposed that can distinguish between
these explanations based on differences between RTW and non—RIW states in
the demand for union representation, the supply of union jobs relative to
that demand, and the observed union—nonunion wage differential. Data from
the Quality of Employment Survey and from the Current Population Survey
are utilized to implement the tests.
The results indicate that the demand for union representation is
significantly lower in states with RTWlaws.At the same time no signi-
ficantdifference is found on the basis of RTW laws in the supply of union
jobs relative to demand. It is also found that the observed union—nonunion
wagedifferential is slightly larger in RTW states.Thispattern is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that RTW laws simply mirror preexisting pre-
ferences against union representation. In its entirety it is not consistent
with the hypothesis that RTW laws cause a decrease in the extent of
unionization.
A final interesting result is that it is found that the extent of
unionization in the south is lower even after controlling for the
presence of RTW laws in many of the states in that region. Further, ft
isdetermined that this is due to a supply of union jobs in the south
thatismore constrained relative to demand than elsewhere. This suggests
that there exist a set of institutional or economicfactors in the south
that makesunion organizing more difficult and expensive independent of
the existence of RTW laws.
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Departmentof Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
E52—564
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
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I. Introduction
The well known lower extent of unionization in the south has
often been argued to be a result of the prevalence in that region of
Right—to—Work (RTW) laws which prevent unions from enforcing contracts
that require workers to join or financially support a labor union as a
condition of employment. Others have argued that RTW laws have no real
effect but merely reflect preexisting preferences against unions. In
this study the relationship between the existence of RTW laws and the
extent of unionization will be examined with particular emphasis both
on distinguishing between these competing hypotheses regarding the
role of RTW laws and on understanding the role these laws play in
causing the observed lower extent of unionization in the south.
As of 1976 RTW laws existed in the nineteen states, nationwide,
listed in table 1.1 Included in the states with RTW laws are ten of
the sixteen states (plus the District of Columbia) in the southern
region, listed in table 2, as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census. The facts that not all southern states have RTW laws and that
RTW laws exist in a number of states outside that region are important
in allowing the separate evaluation of regional factors and RTW laws
as they affect the extent of unionization.
The preliminary evidence suggests that RTW laws and region have
relationships with the extent of unionization that are independent of
each other.Table 3 contains the proportion of the workforce
unionized for a sample of nonmanagerial and nonsales workers outside
the construction industry from the May 1977 Current Population Survey
(CPS) broken down by region and RTW status. The results show that the
extent of unionization is substantially lower both in RTW states (asTable 1. States With Right—to—Work Laws -1976
State Year of Adoption
Alabama.... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . •........ .1953
Arizona...... .. . . . . . . . . * . . . . •..... .1946
Arkansas .. . . . •.. . . •. . .1944
Florida. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..1944
Georgia.... .. . . . . . . . •...... . . . . . . . .1947
Iowa.. .. •....... . •....... . . . . . . . . . .1947
Kansas...... .. . . . . . . . . . . •.. .1958
Mi s s i s s 1 pp i .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 54
Nebraska .. . . . . . . •....... . .1946
Nevada. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1951
North Carolina.. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1947
North Dakota.
South Carolina. .. . . . . . . . . . . .1954
South Dakota.......................1946
Tennessee.. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1947
Texas .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .1947
Utah. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1955
Virginia .•....... . . . •....... .1947
Wyoming.... .. . . . . . . . . . •....... . . . . .1963
Table 2. The Southern Region -U.S.Census Definition
State Right-to-Work Law
Alabama...... .•. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •... .yes
Arkansas...... .. . . •.. . . . . . . . •..... .yes
Delaware .. . . . . . . . . . . •..... .no
District of Columbia. ...... . . . . . .. .no
Florida.... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .yes
Georgia...... .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . •... .yes
Kentucky... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... .flO
Louisiana.. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .... .no
Maryland ... .. ......... . . •. ..no
Mississippi. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .yeS
North Carolina. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .yes
Oklahoma... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .no
South Carolina. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .yes
Tennessee. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .yes
Texas. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .yes
Virginia... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .yes
West Virginia......................no
Note: Louisiana enacted a RTW law in 1977.Given that the empirical
analysis refers to 1977, Louisiana is considered not to have a RTW
law.Table 3. Extent of Unionization by Region and RTW status
Proportion of Labor Force Who Are Union Members
RTW Non RTW All
South .161 .273 .192
Non—South .245 .371 .354
All .188 .359 .305
Sample size by Region and RTW Status
RTW Non RTW All
South 6241 2363 8604
Non—South 2812 17411 20223
All 9053 19774 28827
Note: Sample derived from the May 1977 CPSexcluding managerial,
sales, construction, and self-employed workers. Only employed workers
are included in the sample.Henry S. Farber 2 RTW Laws and Unionization
opposed to non-RTW states) and in thesouthern region (as opposed to
the rest of the United States).The more interesting result is that
within the south the extent of unionization is substantiallylower in
RTW states than in non—RTW states.This also holds true outside the
south. Thus, those who look to RTW laws as an explanationof the
lower extent of unionization in the south may be onthe right track.
However, the figures in table 3 also implythat even after controlling
for RTW laws the extent of unionization is substantiallylower in the
south than outside that region.This suggests that there are factors
within the south which contribute to that region's lowerextent of
unionization independently of RTW laws.
In the next section three distinct explanations forthe observed
correlation between right-to--work laws and the extent ofunionization
are discussed.The first explanation is that RTW laws cause a "free
rider" problem for the union which results in the provisionof less
unionization than would exist otherwise.Essentially, this suggests
that the supply of union jobs will be constrainedrelative to demand
in RTW states.The second explanation relies on the notion that RTW
laws exist only where there is public/politicalsentiment that is not
favorable to unionization.On this basis of this 'tastes" hypothesis
it has been argued that RTW laws are merely areflection of lower
worker demand for union representation and thatthe laws have no
independent effect.The third explanation is that RTW laws weaken
unions by preventing them from requiring that allworkers on. union
jobs become members of the union. Because, bylaw, unions are allowed
to discipline only workers who are membersof the union, the union's
ability to ensure that all workers will participatein a strike or•Henry S. Farber 3 RTW Laws and Unionization
other job action may be reduced. The result may be a weakening of the
bargaining position of the union so that it cannot deliver the
services (e.g., higher wages) to the same extent that it could in the
absence of the laws.This "strike enforcability" hypothesis will
result in a decrease in demand for union representation.Note that
the first and third explanations suggest that RTW laws have real
effects on the extent of unionization, while the second explanation
suggests that RTW laws only reflect nonunion preferences.
While earlier studies of the relationship between right—to—work
laws and the extent of unionization (e.g.; Lumsden and Petersen, 1975;
Warren and Strauss, 1979; Wessels, 1981; and Eliwood and Fine, 1983)
all find the negative correlation noted in table 3, they disagree on
which of the hypotheses described above is the correct explanation.
Each of these studies attempts, using different techniques and
diffferent data, to determine whether the negative correlation is
caused by PTW laws or simply reflects nonunion tastes that result in
RTW laws as well as less unionization.The Warren-Strauss and the
Eliwood—Fine study find that RTW laws have a real effect on the extent
of unionization while the others find that RTW laws have no real
effect and merely reflect pre—existing tastes.What all of these
studies have in common is that they rely solely on data on the extent
of unionization or changes in the extent of unionization.
The set of empirical tests proposed in the next section can
distinguish between these explanations based on differences between
RTWandnon—RTW states in the demand for union representation,. the
supply of union jobs relative to that demand, and the observed union-
nonunion wage differential.The empirical analysis presented in•Henry S. Farber 4 RTW Laws and Unionization
succeeding sections implements these tests usingdata that allow the
identification of variations in the demand for union representation as
distinct from the supply of union jobs.In addition data on the
observed union—nonunion wage differential is analyzed.
In section III data from the May 1977 CPS are analyzedin the
context of a simple probit model of the union statusof workers in
order to investigate in more detail the relationshipsbetween region,
RTW legislation, and unionization. Consistentwith earlier studies and
with the evidence in table 3,it is found after controlling for
individual characteristics and region that the probabilityof a worker
being a union member is lower in RTW states.In addition, it is found
after controlling for individual characteristicsand the presence of
RTW laws that workers in the south have a lower probabilityof being
union members than do nonsouthern workers.In section IV the same
data are used to provide evidence regardingunion-nonunion wage
differentials as they vary by region and RTW status.It is found
after controlling for individual characteristicsand region that the
observed union-nonunion wage differential is slightly higherin RTW
states.
In section V it is argued that the simple probitmodel estimated
in section III is inadequate as an explanation ofthe union status of
wokers and, more importantly, cannot distinguishbetween the competing
hypotheses regarding the role of RTW laws.This is because it cannot
distinguish between shifts in the demand forunion representation and
shifts in the supply of union jobs relative todemand. A model of the
determination of the union status of workers, proposed byFarber
(1983), which has the ability to distinguishbetween supply and demandHenry S. Farber 5 RTW Laws and Unionization
shifts based on the existence of queues for union jobs is developed.
Two empirical specifications are proposed.One relies on single
equationprobittechniquesbut requires somerather strong
assumptions. The other does not demand as strong a setof
assumptions, but it requires the estimation of a trivariate discrete
choice model.
In section VI data from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey
(QES), required to implement the queuing model of the determination of
the union status, of workers are described.These data have an
important piece of information regarding the preferences of nonunion
workers for union representation which can be used to identify worker
demand for union representation as distinct from their actual union
status.
SectionVII contains the results of the singleequation
estimation of the queuing model, and in section VIII the results of
the trivariate estimation are presented.The results derived using
both models suggest that the demand for union representation is lower
in RTW states while the supply of union jobs relative to demand is not
significantly related to the presence of RTW laws..
The final section contains a discussion of the implications of
the analysis for the roles of RTW laws and region in determining the
extentof unionization. While the results cannotcompletely
distinguish between the three competing hypotheses regarding the
correlation between RTW laws and the extent of unionization, the
"tastes" hypothesis fits the data best and it is possible to rule out
the pure "free rider" explanation. In addition, it is found that the
lower extent of unionization in the south is due to a supply of unionHenry S. Farber 6 RTW Laws and Unionization
jobs relative to demand that is lowerthan elsewhere even after
controlling for the existence of RTW laws.No systematic differences
inpreferencesfor union representation between southernand
nonsouthern workers are found after controlling for theexistence of
RTW laws.These results suggest that there are other institutional
and economic factors in the south which constrainthe supply of union
jobs relative to demand and cause thelower extent of unionization in
that region.
II. Why the Relationship between Right—to-Work Lawsand Unionization?
The first explanation for the observed inversecorrelation
between RTW laws and the extent of unionizationis that the laws
permit free riders by allowing workers to enjoythe benefits of
unionization without bearing any of the costs.Essentially, the
argument is that, while unions in stateswith RTW laws cannot require
membership or dues payments, they are notrelieved of the requirement
to fairly represent all workers in the bargainingunit without regard
to membership, financial support, or thelack thereof. In addition,
nonmembers who are working in jobs covered by acollective bargaining
agreement are compensated at the ratenegotiated by the union.2 In
more familiar terms, RTW laws forbidunions from levying taxes in
order to finance the provision of workplace public goods.Unions in
this circumstance must rely on voluntary tax payments.It is not
likely that all workers will make the voluntarytax payments so that,
while worker demand for union representationis unchanged, a union
will supply less than the optimal quantity ofunion services.3 This
translates directly into a supply of union jobswhich is more
constrained relative to demand in RTW states thanin non RTW states.Henry S. Farber 7 RTW Laws and Unionization
Given that workers vary in the benefit that they receive from
union representation, it is interesting to consider which of the
workers who would have been organized in the absence of an RTW law
would still be organized in the presence of an RTW law.Two factors
suggest that it will be those workers for whomthe gain from
unionization (e.g., increased wages) is largest.The first is that
these workers would be most willing to support the union financially
because they have more to lose if they are not organized.The second
is that the union objective function, which is not defined explicitly
here, is likely to be a function of the gain of its members so that
the marginal benefit to the union of increased organization will be
directly related to the benefit perceived by the marginal workers.
Given these factors and holding the cost of unionization fixed, the
union faced with a RTW law will not organize those workers for whom
the gain is relatively small because there are no longer the
guaranteed dues from these workers which are required to offsetthe
costs of organization and administration. This result has an
important empirical implication.To the extent that the benefit of
unionization to a particular worker can be measured by the union-
nonunionwage differential,the observedunion-nonunionwage
differential ought to be larger in RTW states.4
To summarize, the "free rider" hypothesis of the effect of RTW
laws has a number of empirical implications.First, the supply of
union jobs will be more constrained relative to demand in RTW states.
Second, the demand for union representation will be no lowerin RTW
states, and it may even be higher due to the factthat workers may
perceive that they can enjoy the benefitsof union representationHenry S. Farber 8 RTW Laws and Unionization
without bearing the dues costs.Finally, it is expected that the
observed union—nonunion wage differential will be larger in RTW states
than in non—RTW states.
The second explanation for the observed inverse correlation
between right—to—work laws and the extent of unionization is that
workers in RTW states have a lower demand for union representation on
nonpecuniary grounds. This "tastes" hypothesis suggests that RTW laws
merely act as a proxy for unobserved preferences for nonunion
employment on the part of workers.By this hypothesis, those workers
who do become unionized in RTW states are those for whom the pecuniary
advantages of unionization are sufficient to outweigh the nonpecuniary
disadvantages. Totheextent that theunion-nonunionwage
differential captures the pecuniary benefits of union representation,
thetasteshypothesis suggests that theunion-nonunionwage
differential will be larger in RTW states.5
Theempirical implications of the tasteshypothesisare
threefold. First, it suggeststhat the demand forunion
representation ought to be lower in RTW states.Second, it suggests
that the supply of union jobs relative to the demand ought to be
unaffected by the presence of the laws.Finally, the union-nonunion
wage differential ought to be larger in RTW states than elsewhere.
The final explanation for the inverse correlation between right-
to—work laws and the extent of unionization is based on the notion
that RTW laws weaken the ability of unions to deliver services, such
as wage increases or an effective grievance machinery, to its members.
This effect of RTW laws is a result of the fact that unions cannot
discipline nonmembers even if they are employed on a job that isHenry S. Farber 9 RTW Laws and Unionization
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The power to discipline
workers is an important component of the union's ability to make the
threat of a strike (or other legitimate job action) credible. A union
member who refuses to honor a strike that is legitimately called by
union leaders faces discipline at the hands of the union which can
include financial penalties.In contrast to this, a worker who is
employed on a job that is covered by a collective bargaining agreement
but who is not a member of the union is not subject to any formal
sanctions from the union.Thus, a union in a PTW state cannot make a
credible strike threat unless it is sure that it has the overwhelming
support of the covered workers while a union in a non-RTW state can
make a credible strike threat without such overwhelming support.
Two points are worth making in regard to the enforcability of
strikes or other job actions. First, note that this is another aspect
of the free rider problem induced by RTW laws.Nonmembers can
continue working and earning income during a strike, and, when the
strike is over, they will share equally in the benefits through the
union's duty of fair representation.Essentially, the nonmembers
share in the benefits of the strike without bearing any of the costs.6
The second point is that there may be very strong social sanctions in
the workplace which provide the incentive for all workers, regardless
of membership status, to support a strike or other job action. Such
sanctions will obviate the need for formal disciplinary mechanisms on
the part of the union, and the effect of RTW laws on the enforcability
of strikes or other job actions will not be important.7
The importance of the strike threat to the union is that it in
part determines the leverage that the union has in bargaining with theHenry S. Farber 10 RTW Laws and Unionization
employer.Other things equal, where the union cannot strike as
readily the employer will be less willing to concede to theunion.
Thus, the relative inability of unions in RTW states to enforcethe
threat of a strike or other job action will result in a decreased
ability to deliver benefits to workers in RTW states.
The empirical implications of the reduction in the ability of
unions in RTW states to deliver benefits to workers are threefold.
First, the demand for union representation will be lower due tothe
lower level of benefits. In addition, the reduction in the benefits
of unionization will result in a decline in the supply of union jobs
as unions recognize that the marginal benefitof organization is
lower. However, the supply of union jobs relative to demand will not
be affected systematically by the reduction in the ability of unions
to deliver benefits.Finally, to the extent that wage gains from
unionization capture the bulk of the benefits of unionization, the
observed union-nonunion wage differential ought to be unaffected by
the presence of RTW laws.This is because the cost to workers of
union representation is not affected by the unenforcability of strikes
or other job actions in RTW states so that, while fewerworkers will
desire union representation, those who do will be those who derive a
level of benefit from union representation which is at least as great
as the (unchanged) cost.
Allthreehypotheses outlined above have theempirical
implication that the extent of unionization will be inverselyrelated
to the presence of right-to—work laws. Thus, on this grounds they are
indistinguishable empirically.However, the three hypotheses have
different sets ofimplications for thedemand forunionHenry S. Farber 11 RTW Laws and Unionization
representation, the supply of union jobs relative to demand, and the
observedunion—nonunionwage differential.8The "freerider"
hypothesis suggests that demand will be unchanged by RTW laws, supply
relative to demand will be reduced by RTW laws, and the union-nonunion
differential will be increased by the presence of RTW laws.The
"tastes" hypothesis suggests that RTW laws have no real effects but
thatthey will be associated with a lower demand forunion
representation, a supply of union jobs relative to demand which is
unaffected by the laws, and a larger observed union-nonunion wage
differential. Finally, the "strike enforcability" hypothesis suggests
that RTW laws reduce the demand for union representation, leave the
supply of union jobs relative to demand unchanged, and leave the
union-nonunion wage differential unchanged.Note that there is no
reason to expect that these hypotheses are mutually exclusive so that
if more than one of the hypotheses is valid then some combination of
the hypothesized effects could be found.
A note of caution is that the interpretation of the results of
the proposed test of the effects of RTW laws could be confounded if
the ability of the union to negotiate benefits for its members is
adversely affected by a decline in the extent of unionization in the
relevant product market. Briefly, where the extent of unionization is
lower there may be a greater threat of competition from nonunion labor
employed by firms in the same industry.In this situation the
potential decline in union labor demand associated with a given
increase in wages will be larger, i.e., the elasticity of damand for
union labor will be larger.The relevance of this potential problem
is mitigated by the fact that a large fraction of unionized workers,•Henry S. Farber 12 RTW Laws and Unionization
particularly in manufacturing industries, are employed by firms that
sell in national product markets which implies that less unionization
within RTW states does not have a differential effect on the ability
of unions to provide benefits to members within RTW states.However,
to the extent that the ability of unions to deliver benefits to
workers within RTW states is differentially affected through this
mechanism, the "free rider" and the "tastes" hypotheses will both have
the sameimplications described for the "strikeenforcement"
hypothesis in addition to the implications attributed toeach
hypothesis above.It would be difficult in this situation to
distinguish between the three hypotheses.
III. Estimation of a Probit Model of the Union Status of Workers
Consider a model where the union status of a worker is determined
by the value of an unobservable variable (y) which represents the
propensity of a worker to be a union member.If y is positive then
the individual will be a union member, and if y is negative then the
worker will not be a union member. More formally let
(1) y=XB+e
where x represents a vector of individual characteristics that affect
the probability of union membership, B is a vector of parameters, and
e represents unmeasured factors affecting the probability of union
membership. The probability that a worker will be a union member is
(2) Pr(U=1) =Pr(y>O)=Pr(e>-XB)
where U is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual is a union
member and is zero otherwise. If it is assumed that e is distributed
as a standard normal random variable then Pr(e>—XB) is a standardHeny S.Farber 13 RTW Laws and Unionization
normal cumulative distribution function (N) and the probability that a
worker is a union member is
(3) Pr(tJ=1) =N(XB).
The probit likelihood function over a sample of workers for whom U and
Xareobserved can be derived in a strightforward fashion from this
relationship.
A behavioral model which would have the form suggested by this
simple probit model is one where y represents the difference between
the utility that a worker receives as a union member and the utility
he receives not as a union member and where the worker is free to
choose his union status. In other words y represents the net benefit
of union membership, and a worker will be a union member if the net
benefit is positive.10It will be argued below that it is not
possible to model the union status of workers as strictly the result
of individual choice without consideration of the supply of union jobs
and employer hiring criteria.For this reason it is preferable to
think of the probit model specified here and estimated in this section
as a "reduced form" relationship summarizing the partial correlations
thatexistin the data between union membershipandother
characteristics rather than as a precisely defined structural model.
Table 4 contains the means and standard deviations of relevant
variables for a sample of 28827 workers from the May 1977 CPS.The
table also contains means and statndard deviations for the associated
union and nonunion subsamples.Managerial, sales, construction, and
self—employed workers were deleted from the sample because the process
of unionization for these workers is different from that for most of


















Table 4. Means (Standard Deviations) of Data
Current Population Survey, May 1977
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SampleSample Sample































=1 if works on union job
=1 if worker in RTW state
=1 if worker resides in south




=1 if married female
=1 if industry is manufacturing
=1 if occupation is clerical
=1 if occupation is service
=1 if occupation is professional
or technical
log of hourly earnings
education in years 12.3
(2.87)
age in years 36.6
(12.6)
labor market exper. (Age-Ed—6) 19.3
(13.3)
28827 Sample sizeHenry S. Farber 14 RTW Laws and Unionization
not protected by the National Labor Relations Act which governs
organization among the majority of private sector workers, and
construction workers differ from the majority of workers in that
hiring by union employers in that industry is done through hiring
halls controlled by the relevant craft unions. These sample selection
criteria also make the sample comparable to the sample of 'workers from
the 1977 cross—section of the Quality of Employment Survey used in
later sections. Indeed, this comparability is the primary reason why
the May 1977 CPS rather than a more recent CPS was selected.The
union status variable is computed from the response to a question
regarding whether or not the individual is a union member.11 The base
group for the dichotomous variables consists of white single males who
live outside the south in a state without a right-to-work law and who
work on a blue collar nonunion job in a nonmanufacturing industry.
Table5 contains estimates of the probit model of union
membership estimated over the sample described in table 4.The
estimates in the first column allow South and RTW to have independent
effects on the probability of union membership although the effect of
RTW laws is constrained to be the same in all regions.The estimates
in the second column relax this constraint by including the separate
variable South*RTW. Given the extremely large sample size, it is not
surprising that all of the estimated coefficients are significantly
different from zero at conventional levels using asynptotic ttests.
With regard to the individual specific characteristics, the results
are generally consistent with those derived in earlier studies. In
particular, nonwhites and married males are more likely to be union
members, while females and workers in non—blue collar occupations areTable 5. Estimates of Union Membership Probit






























Note: The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.. LJtL RTW Laws and Unionization
less likely to be union members. It is interesting that older workers
are found to be more likely to be union members.This is consistent
with the notion that older workers prefer unions due to the fact that
they provide relatively more of the benefits, such as pensions, that
are valued by older workers.However, earlier evidence using other
data (Farber and Saks, 1980; Farber, 1983) suggests that older workers
are less likely to prefer union representation.
In order to facilitate the discussion of the effects of region
and RTW laws on the extent of unionization, table 6 contains predicted
probabilitiesanddifferences between probabilities of union
membership for "standard" individuals living in states with and
without RTW laws and living in and out of the south.These
probabilities are computed using the estimates in the second column of
table 5.The approximate asymptotic standard errors ofthese
probabilities and differences, computed using a first order expansion
of the relevant function,are also presented.The "standard"
individual is a 30 year old white single male with 12 years of
education who works in a blue collar occupation.
The important point to note from these results is that the
probability of union membership is lower in the south even after
controlling for the presence of RTW laws.Similarly, RTW laws are
associated with a lower probability of union membership even after
controlling for region.This suggests that there is more to the low
level of unionization in the South than can be accounted for by the
mere presence of RTW laws or any differences in the composition of the
labor force.In addition,it suggests that there is more to the
inverse relationship between RTW laws and the extent of unionizationTable 6:
Predicted Probabilities of Union Membership and Differences
by RTW status and Region.






Differences in Probability of Union Membership
(row specification —columnspecification)
Nonsouth South Nonsouth South
non-RTW non-RTW RTW RTW
Nonsouth non—RTW .118 .123 .247
(.0110) (.0100) (.00703)





Note:The numbers in parentheses are approximate asymptoticstandard
errors derived from a first—order expansion ofthe relevant function
around the estimated parameter values contained in the secondcolumn
of table 5.All workers are 30 year old white single males with 12
years education who are workingin blue collar occupations.Henry S. Farber 16 RTW Laws and Unionzatiofl
than can be accounted for by "anti—union" attitudes in thesouth or by
differences in labor force composition in RTW states.
Another result is that, while the parameter estimates suggest
that the relationship between RTW laws and the probabilityof union
membership is marginally significantly different atconventional
levels within the south as compared to outside that region,the
predictedprobability differences do not bear thisout.
particular, the predicted difference between the probabilitiesof
union membership outside the south for non—RTW states and RTW states
equals .123.The same comparison within the south yields an almost
identical probability difference of .129.Thus, it can be concluded
that the overall relationship between RTW laws and the extentof
unionization is virtually identical in the south and outside that
region.
IV. Right—to—Work laws and the Union—Nonunion WageDifferential
The observed union—nonunion wage differential is an important
component of the empirical tests outlinedin section II to distinguish
betweenthevariouscompeting explanations for theinverse
relationship between RTW laws and the extent ofunionization. In this
section earnings functions are estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS) over the sample from the May 1977 CPSdescribed in table 4.
In line with common practice consider an earningsfunction of the
form
(4) ln(Wage) =XB+T1RTW+T2U+T3U*RTW+e
where X represents a vector of individual characteristics,B is a
vector of parameters, the T1 are parameters,and e represents
unmeasured factors that affect earnings.The parameter T2 measuresHenry S. Farber 17 RTW Laws and Unionization
approximately the proportionalunion—nonunion wage differential in
non-RTW states, while the sum of the parametersT2 and T3 measures
approximately the UfllOfl—flOflUfllOfl wagedifferential in RTW states. On
this basis the quantity of interest,the difference in the observed
union—nonunion wage differential betweenRTW states and non—RTW
states, is simply T3 which is thecoefficient of U*RTW.
Estimates of the parameters ofthis earnings function are
contained in the first column of table7.The results indicate an
averageunion-nonunion wage differential in non-RTWstates of
approximately 18.7 percent.The coefficient on the interactionof U
and RTW is .0325, and it is significantlydifferent from zero at
conventional levels using a t—test.This suggests that the union-
nonunion wage differential is slightly largerin RTW states.
It has been argued that theunion-nonunion wage differential is
not uniform across workers of differentcharacteristics.12 If this is
the case then the earnings functioncontained in equation (4) is mis—
specified because it allows for only aconstant proportional shift in
earnings on the basis of union status.The results derived on this
basis regarding the relationship betweenRTW laws and the union
nonunionwage differential mightbe misleading. In order to
investigate this potential problem, anunconstrained version of the
earnings relationship can bederived by estimating separatefunctions
over the union and nonunion subsamples.
These functions will have the
form
(5) ln(Wage) =XB+ T1RTW + e.
The difference between the estimatedcoefficients of RTW (T1) for the
two subsamples is a measure ofthe difference in theunion-nonunionTable 7. Estimates of Earnings Functions
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wage differential between RTW and non-RTW states.
The second and third columns of table 7 contain estimates of
separate earnings functions for the union andnonunion subsamples
respectively.The results are consistent with those derived in
earlier studies in that the union earnings function is "flatter" than
the nonunion earnings function in skill dimensions such as education
and experience. This may reflect the standardization of wage rates
often associated with labor unions.With regard to RTW laws, the
coefficients on RTW are negative in both equations which suggests that
earnings are generally lower in RTW states.However, the negative
coefficient is smaller in the union equation than in the nonunion
equation so that, as in the single equation model, the union—nonunion
differential is larger in RTW states.The difference between the RTW
coefficients is .0293 with a standard error of .0117. This difference
is significantly different from zero at conventional levels although
it is rather small in magnitude.It is comparable in size to the
coefficient on U*RTW in the single equation formulation.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the union-nonunion wage
differential is slightly larger in RTW states than in non-RTW states.
A larger differential in RTW states is consistent with both the "free
rider" hypothesis and the "tastes" hypothesis.It is not consistent
with the pure "strike enforcability" hypothesis and the results found
herecan be considered as preliminary evidenceagainst that
hypothesis.
V. A Queuing Model of the Determination of the Union Status of Workers
In order to go further with the analysis of the effects of right—Henry S. Farber 19 RTW Laws and Unionization
to-work laws it is necessary to develop a model of union status which
separately identifies the demand for union representation from the
supply of union jobs.'3 It is argued here that the union status of
workers is determined as the result of separate decisions by workers
and by potential union employers.Workers decide whether they would
prefer union or nonunion jobs based on the utilities that these jobs
yield to them.At the same time, union employers decide which of the
workers who want union jobs to hire given that workers differ in their
productive characteristics and that these workers are compensated
differently in the union and nonunion sectors.Essentially, union
employers are assumed to hire the workers who enable them to produce
at minimum cost.
This model is based on the presumption that union employers have
some discretion in hiring as a result of the existence of queues for
vacancies in existing union jobs.14 These queues result from the
facts that it is unlikely that dues and initiation fees completely
offset the advantadges of unionization for all workers and that it is
expensive to create new union jobs by organizing nonunion jobs.15
More fundamentally, the queues result from a distinction, arising from
the process of unionization, which must be drawn between the union
status of workers and the union status of jobs.Nonunion jobs become
unionized through organization of workers who hold them.This is a
costly and uncertain process which can involve the holding of an
election supervised by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).16
These elections are often preceded by intense and closely monitered
campaigns, and they may involve appeals by either or both sides to the
NLRBregardingsuch issues as illegal campaigntacticsandHenry S. Farber 20 RTW Laws and Unionization
determination of the appropriate bargaining unit.However, once
the jobs are successfully unionized, their union status is preserved
even if the workers who made the investment in organization leave.17
In addition,new jobs created through expansion ofunionized
establishments are unionized by definition.Union employers can hire
whomever they wish to fill any vacancies, but all new hirees will be
covered by the collective bargaining agreement.In addition, if the
union has negotiated a contract with a union shop provision and the
establishment is not in a RTW state then the new employees will have
to become union members.Thus, unless dues or initiation fees are
sufficiently large, there will be workers who desire vacancies in
existing union jobs but who are not willing to undertake investment in
new unionization.For these workers the benefits of unionization are
larger than the costs of union membership but smaller than the costs
of organizing nonunion jobs. The results are queues for union jobs.
Inorderto identify separately thedemandforunion
representation from the supply of union jobs, data from the Quality of
Employment Survey (QES) on both the union status of workers and on
the explicit preferences of nonunion workers for union representation
are utilized. The crucial bit of information is the response elicited
from nonunion workers as to whether or not they would vote for union
representation (VFU) on their current job were a secret ballot
election to be held.Analyzed appropriately, these data allow the
identification of the demand for union representation of all workers
and, combining this information with the information on union status,
of the supply of union jobs relative to this demand.
Thedecisionof an individual worker todemandunionHenry S. Farber 21 RTW Laws and Unionization
representation is based on a comparison of the worker's utilities in
the union and nonunion sectors.More formally, if M represents the
difference between the worker's utility on a union job and his utility
on a nonunion job, then the worker will desire a union job if and only
if M>O. Given that workers are heterogeneous in their preferences for
unionrepresentation to the extent that workers ofdifferent
characteristics derive different amounts of pecuniary arid nonpecuniary
benefits from unionization, M will vary across workers. A convenient
parameterization for the worker preference criterion as a function of
individual characteristics is
(6) M =XG1+1
whereX is a vector of observable individual characteristics, G1 is a
parametervector, andu1 representsunobservableindividual
characteristicswhichaffectworkerpreferences for union
representation. If a variable reflecting the RTW status of the state
of residence of the worker is included in X then its coefficient will
reflect the correlation of the demand for union representation with
RTW laws after controlling for the other components of X.
If worker preferences for union representation were observable
for all workers then, by assuming a particular distribution for the
disturbance,the model could be implemented empirically in a
straightforward fashion.If u1 were distributed normally then a
probit model of the type implemented in section III on union status
would be appropriate.The problem is that with information soley on
union status it is not known whether a nonunion worker did not desire
a union job or desired a union job but was not hired by a union
employer.This is the essence of the queuing problem. The auxiliaryHenry S. Farber 22 RTW Laws and Unionization
information on VFU for nonunion workers available in the QES provides
some help with this problem.
One approach to utilization of this information is to assume that
all union workers desired union representation at the time that they
were hired and that all nonunion workers who answered the VFU question
affirmatively currently desire union representation.This provides
one observation for each individual on their demand forunion
representation. Note that the timing is crucial here.For example,
it is not correct to assume that all union workers currently desire
union representation.They may desire that their job become nonunion
but they are not willing to sacrifice the nonportable benefits of
seniority to take a nonunion job elsewhere.The simple probit model
can be implemented both by assuming that the disturbance (u1)is time
invariant and has a standard normal distribution and by measuring the
Xvariablesat the appropriate point in time.
In order to determine how the relative supply of union jobs
varies,it is necessary to model the employer decision criterion
regarding which workers to hire.This is the result of a comparison
by the employer of the relative cost of producing using workersof
differing characteristics, and hence differing productivities,in
order to hire those workers who. enable him to produce at least cost.
The structure of compensation in the union sector relative to
productivity combined with the distribution of workers whodesire
union representation relative to the supply of unionized jobs defines
a threshold level of cost which represents themaximum that a union
employer will be willing to pay for productivity adjustedlabor. In
this context a worker will be hired by a union employer only if hisHenry S. Farber 23 RTW Laws and Unionization
productivity adjusted labor cost is less than this threshold.Note
that the threshold is an inverse function of the supply of union jobs
relative to demand.
In more formal terms, the criterion for a union employer in a
given geographic or occupational labor market to hire a particular
worker is that the productivity adjusted labor cost of that worker (C)
be smaller than the thteshold (K) in that labor market.Let H=C—K
represent the difference between union productivity adjusted labor
cost and the threshold so that the union employer criterion for hiring
a particular worker is that H<O.A convenient parameterization for
this union employer hiring criterion as a function of individual
characteristics (X) is
(7) H =XG2+U2
whereG2 represents a vector of parameters and u2 represents
unobservable individual characteristics that affect the employer
decision process.The factors that affect H reflect variation in the
supply of union jobs across different geographic and occupational
labor markets as well as variation in productivity adjusted labor cost
of different workers. If a variable reflecting the RTW status of the
state of residence of the worker is included in X then its coefficient
will measure the relationship between the relative supply of union
jobs and RTW laws after controlling for the other components of X.
If it was known for all workers in a sample which of them desired
a union job then the model could be implemented in a straightforward
fashion by estimating the probability that a worker who desired union
representation is actually working on a union job.Essentially, this
involves assuming a distribution for u2 over the subsample of workersHenry S. Farber I-TW aws anc unionization
who desire union representation. If this distribution were assumed to
be a standard normal then the model would be probit model of union
status estimated over the subample of workers who desired union
representation.However, as discussed above, with information of
union status alone it is not possible to determine which of the
nonunion workers desired union representation but were not hired by
nonunion employers.Once again, the information on VFU can help with
this problem.
Clearly, union workers were hired by union employers at the time
they started their present job.However, the information on VFU
available for nonunion workers reflects current preferences for union
representation rather than preferences at the time they started their
current job.Once again the timing is critical.It is entirely
possible that a worker who desired union representation at the time he
startedhis current nonunion job may no longer desireunion
representation. Similarly, a nonunion worker may not have desired a
union job at the time he started his current job but over time has
changed his decision.Both the inability to be hired by a union
employer and the fixed costs of job mobility for workers who have
accrued seniority will prevent workers form moving in order to
accommodate these preferences. In order to utilize the information on
VFU in the context of this simple model, it is necessary to make the
rather strong assumption that the response of nonunion workers to the
VFU question reflects their preference for union representation at the
time they started their present job as well as currently.
By making this assumption it is possible to "identify" the subset
of workers who desired union representation at the time they startedHenry S. Farber 25 RTW Laws and Unionization
their current job. This subset consists of all workers who either are
working on a union job or who are working on a nonunion job and
answeredthe VFU question affirmatively. Assumingthatthe
disturbance (u2)is distributed as a standard normal, the employer
choice equation can be estimated over this subsample as a simple
probit model.
There is a potential econometric problem with this relatively
simple technique. This is that it is unlikely that the distributional
assumption made for u2 is valid. While it may be reasonable to assume
that u2 is distributed normally over the entire sample, the subsample
is selected largely on the basis of worker preferences for union
represention. These preferences are determined by the process
summarized in equation (6), and it is likely the unmeasured factors
affecting worker preferences (u1) are correlated with the unmeasured
facors affecting the employer selection criterion (u2).Thus, the
subsample of workers who desire union representation is selected on
the basis of a varIable which is correlated with the disturbance in
the model, and, as a result, the distribution of u2 will not be a
simple normal.In fact, the distribution over the subsample will
depend on all of the parameters of the worker preference model (G1)in
a complicated way.
While estimates of the two simple probit models derived above
will be presented in section VII, the potential econometric problems
along with the rather strong assumptions required to derive the
appropriate subsample of workers for the employer selection estimation
suggest that an alternative estimation strategy beconsidered. Assume
that over the entire sample the unobserved components of the model (u1Henry S. Farber 26 RTW Laws and Unionization
and u2) can be assumed to be correlated for any particular individual
butare distributed independently across different individuals.
Assume further that these random variable have a standard bivariate
normal distribution with correlation P12k
The next step is to determine exactly what can be learned about
worker and employer preferences from the data on union status and the
response to the VFU question.Clearly, for union workers what is
known on the basis of union status is that these workers desired union
representation and were hired by a union employer at the time they
started their current job. From equations (6) and (7) the probability
that a worker will be unionized is
(8) Pr(U=1) =Pr(M0>O,I-I<O) =Pr(u1>—X0G1, u2<—X0G2)
where the "0" subscript dates the variables at the time of hire.
Similarly, for nonunion workers what is known on the basis of
unionstatus alone is that they' either did not desire union
representation at the time they started their current job or they did
but were not hired by a union employer at that timesThe probability
of this event is simply Pr(U=0) =1—Pr(U=1).However, for nonunion
workers the response to the VFTJ question provides the additional
information regarding whether the worker currently desires union
representation.On the basis of the model derived above, a worker
will answer the VFU question affirmatively if M>O where, from
equation (6),
(9)M=XG1+u3
and where the "c" subscript refers to the current time.The
disturbance term (u3) represents unmeasured factors whichat the
currenttime affect worker preferences for union representation, andHenry S. Farber 27 RTW Laws and Unionization
is assumed to have a standard normal distribution which may be
correlated with u1 and u2.
While current preferences for union representation, determined by
M, are not observed for all workers, the joint probability that they
are observed (U=0) and that the individual currently desires union
representation (VFU=l) can be derived in a straightforward fashion as
(10) Pr(U=0, VFU=1) =Pr(M0>O,H0>O, M>O) +Pr(M0<O,M>O)
=Pr(u1>-X0G1, u2>-X0G2, u3>-XGi)
+Pr(u1<—X0G1,u3>—XGi)
where the probability functions are derived from thestandard
trivariate normal distribution assumed for the disturbances.The
first term represents the joint probability that the worker desired a
union job at the time he started his current job but was not hired by
a union employer and that he currently desires a union job.The
second term represents the joint probability that the individual did
not desire a union job at the time he started his current job but
currently desires a union job.
Analogously, the joint probability that current preferences are
observed (U=0) and that the individual does not currently desire union
representation (VFUO) is
(11) Pr(U=0, VFU=0) =Pr(M0>0,H0>O, M<O) +Pr(M3<0,M<O)
=Pr(u1>-X0G1, u2>-X0G2, u3<-XGi)
+Pr(u1<-X0G1,u3<—XG1)
where the first term represents the joint probability that the worker
desired a union job at the time he started his current job but was not
hired by a union employer and that he currently does not desire a
union job.The second term represents the joint probability that theHenry S. Farber 1(1W£wbILUU11aL.V
individualdid not desire a union job at the time he started his
current job and still does not desire a union job.
Given the data from the QES on union status for all workers and
on VFTJ for nonunion workers, the probabilities defined in equations
(8), (10), and (11) can be used to define an appropriate likelihood
function over the sample which accounts for all of the observed data.
It can be thought of as a censored data model where the information on
VFU is censored on the basis of union status which is an obviously
related variable. The likelihood function derived here represents the
standard approach to a problem of this sort in that the censoring
process (union status determination) is specified jointlywith the
censored process (current worker preferences).Much efficiency is
gained through this approach due to the fact that the parameters of
the worker preference function (G1) are common to both the union
statusdeterminationmodel(U) andthecurrentpreference
determination model (VFU). At the same time quite a bit of
flexibility in preferences over time is built in due to the fact that
the variables in X can change over time (e.g., age and seniority) and
the fact that the unobservables that affect worker preferences at
different points in time (u1 and u3) are different though correlation
is allowed for.
In the next section the QES data are described before turning to
the estimation, in section VII, of the two single equation probit
models on worker preferences and employer hiring criteria. In section
VIII the trivariate model is estimated.The two specifications yield
similar results, and as a result the analysis of the results focuses
on the estimates of the trivariate model due to its greater efficiencyHenry S. Farber 29 RTW Laws and Unionization
and relative lack of restrictive underlying assumptions.
VI. The Quality of Employment Survey Data
The data used to implement the queuing model are from the 1977
cross-section of the Quality of Employment Survey (QES) developed by
the Survey Research Center of the University of MIchigan.The QES
contains data for approximately 1500 randomly selected workers (both
unionand nonunion) on their personal characteristics and job
attributes.18 The particular sample for use in this study was derived
from the QES by selecting those workers for whom the survey contained
valid information on the variables listed in table 8.As discussed
above in relation to the analysis of the CPS data, self-employed
workers; managers; sales workers; and construction workers were
deleted from the sample due to the fact that the union status of these
workers is determined by a different process than that outlined in the
previous section. The remaining sample contains 915 workers. Table 8
contains descriptions of the variables used in the study as well as
their means and standard deviations for the entire sample and the
union and nonunion subsamples.The base group for the dichotomous
variables consists of white nonsouthern unmarried male blue collar
workers with twelve years of education who do not live a RTW state.
On average, the 37 percent of the sample who are unionized are
slightly older and are more likely to be male, married, nonwhite,
nonsouthern, and in a blue collar occupation.In contrast to the
membership criterion used with the CPS data, unionization is defined
here as working on a job that is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement.The means for the QES subsample contained in table 8 are
comparable to the means for the much larger sample from the May 1977Table 8. Means (Standard Deviations) of Data







=1 if works on union job .3681.0 0.0
VFU =1 ifdesires union represent. ——— ——— .370
RTW =1 ifworker in RTW state .336 .228 .398
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CPS contained in table 4.
The crucial bits of information for this study are data on the
union status of the jobs held by the individuals and the response to
the question, asked only of nonunion workers, "If an election were
held with secret ballots, would you vote for or against having a
union or employee association represent you?".This latter variable
is the VFUmeasurereferred to in the previous section, and it is the
piece of information which is unique to this data set.It is
interpreted here as the current preference of a worker for union
representation on his current job. Thus,it holds alljob
characteristics fixed, including seniority, except those which the
worker expects the union to affect.Fully 37 percent of the nonunion
sample responded to this question in the affirmative so that there is
substantial variation in the response.
VII. Single Equation Estimation of the Queuing Model of Union Status
The single equation probit version of the worker demand for union
representationmodel was implemented by creating a dichotomous
variable called DES, where DES=1 if the individual either was a union
worker or was a nonunion worker who answered the VFU question
affirmatively. The variable DES=0 otherwise. The probit relationship
was derived from equation (6) under the assumptions that DES=lif and
only if M>0 and that u1 has a standard normal distribution.The two
variables that can change over time, age and seniority, are measured
at the current time for nonunion workers and at the start of the job
for union workers.This is consistent with the discussion of timing
in the previous section.Note that by this definition the seniorityHenry S. Farber 31 RTW Laws and Unionization
variable refers to nonunion seniority and that all union workers have
zero nonunion seniority.19
The estimates of the probit model of worker preferences for union
representation are contained in the first column of table 9.Because
the focus of this study is on the relationships between union status,
region and right-to-work laws and because the results from a similar
specification have been discussed elsewhere (Farber; 1982, 1983), the
discussion of the results will be confined to the South and RTW
variables.The estimates suggest that workers in RTW states perceive
a significantly lower probability of desiring union representation
while, after controlling for the presence of RTW laws, workers in the
south do not differ significantly from other workers in their
preference for union representation.2°
The results contained in the second column of table 9 pertain to
a model which is identical to the first except that the RTW variable
is omitted.These estimates are identical to those contained in the
first column with the exception that it now appears that southern
workers perceive a significantly smaller advantage than nonsouthern
workers from union representation.This interpretation is clearly a
result of bias due to the excluded RTW variable.It can be concluded
that there are substantive differences in the demand for union
representation within the south that are either caused by or are
indicated by RTW laws.
With regard to the empirical tests of the effects of RTW laws,
these results suggest that the demand for union representation is
lower in RTW states.This is consistent with both the "tastes" and
the "strike enforcability" hypotheses.It is not consistent with theVa r jab 1 e
Table 9. Estimates of Single Equation Probits
Quality of Employment Survey, 1977













































































































































log L —503.0 —507.3 —327.3 —332.0 —543.3
SampleSize 915 915 551 551 915
Note:The numbersin parentheses are asymptoticstandarderrors.Henry S. Farber 32 RTW Laws and Unionization
"free rider" hypothesis. However, given the potentialeconometric and
substantive problems with the simple probit analysis, a moredetailed
discussion will await the estimates from the trivariate model.
The single equation probit model of the union employer hiring
function was implemented by creating a dichotomous variablecalled
HIRE defined over the sample of workers for whom DES=1.This sample
consists of the 551 workers who were either working on aunion job or
were nonunion but answered the VFU questionaffirmatively. The
variable is defined so that HIRE=1 if the individual was aunion
worker (hired by a union employer) and HIRE=O (nothired by a union
employer despite a preference for union representation)otherwise.
The probit relationship was derived from equation (7)under the
assumptions that HIRE1 if and only if -H>O andthat -u2 has a
standard normal distribution.21 All of the variables in thismodel
reflect conditions at the time of starting the current job sothat
implicit in this specification is that the current responseto the VFU
question is a valid indicator of preference forunion representation
at the start of the current job. By this definition seniority does
not enter the model.The estimation using this sample is conditional
in the sense that the sample is selected conditional onworkers
desiring union representation so that the computed probabilityis the
probability that a worker is hired by a union employerconditional on
desiring a union job.
The third column of table 9 contains estimates of the probit
model of the probability of being hired by a unionemployer
conditional on desiring a union job.The estimates suggest that
workers in RTW states who desire a union job have a probabilityofHenry S. Farber 33 RTW Laws and Unionization
desiring union representation that is not significantly different at
conventional levels from that in non—RTW states after controlling for
individual characteristics and region.On the other hand, southern
workers who desire union representation do have a significantly lower
probability of being hired by a union employer.What this implies is
that the supply of union jobs is more constrained relative to demand
in the south than outside that region even after controlling for the
presence of RTW laws which themselves show nocorrelation with the
relative supply of union jobs.
The estimates in the fourth column of table 9 refer to a model
which is identical to that contained in the third columnwith the
exception that the South variable is excluded.In this specification
the probability that a worker who desires a union job is hired by a
union employer is estimated to be significantly lower in RTW states.
This is strictly a result of the bias induced by the fact that the
omitted South variable is correlated with the RTW variable. It can be
concluded that there is a significant difference in the ability of
workers to attain union employment in the south which is not
attributable to the prevalence of RTW laws in the south.
With regard to the empirical tests of RTW laws, these results
suggest that the relative supply of union jobs is no moreconstrained
in RTW states than elsewhere.This is not consistent with the "free
rider" hypothesis, but it is consistent with both the "tastes"
hypothesis and the "strike enforcability" hypothesis.Once again,
given the potential econometric problems and the strongassumptions
required to implement the simple probit model, a moredetailed
discussion is postponed until after the presentation of the resultsHen:y S. Farber 34 RTW Laws and Unionization
for the trivariate model.
A final note with regard to the single equation formulations
concerns the estimates of simple probit model of union status,
estimated over the entire sample from the QES and contained in the
last column of table 9.These estimates are comparable to those
derived for the CPS and contained in table 5.They illustrate the
overall relationhip of region and RTW laws with the probability that a
worker is unionized.The results are very similar to those dervied
above using the CPS, with the exception of the negative coefficient on
Age.The estimates suggest that the probability that a worker is
unionizedis significantly negatively related to both southern
residence and residence in a RTW state.Overall, the demand and
supply models estimated in this section imply that the inverse
correlation between unionization and southern residence is due to
relative supply constraints while the inverse correlation between
unionization and RTW laws is due to lower demand in RTW states.
VIII. Simultaneous Estimation of the Queuing Model
Using the data from the QES described in section VI; the
likelihoodfunction derived from the probability statements in
equations (8), (10),and (11);and the assumption that the
disturbances have a standard trivariate normal distribution, the
maximum likelkihood estimates of the parameters of the model can be
derived in a relatively straightforward fashion.The parameters of
the model consist of the elements of the two vectors, G1 and G2, and
the three correlations (p1) between u1, u2, and u3. The likelihood
function and its derivatives consist of univariate, bivariate, and
trivariate normal cumulative distribution functions which, while theyHenry S. Farber 35 RTW Laws and Unionization
cannot be evaluated in closed form, can be approximated numerically to
the required accuracy.
Some difficulty in convergence to a local maximum was encountered
for some, though not all, specifications of the model. The difficulty
seemed to be related to the fact that the likelihood function is
exteremely flat in the dimensions defined by two of the elements of
the correlation matrix of the errors, P12 and P23• This flatness was
noted, and discussed by Farber (1983).The result was that for some
specifications of the model the three by three correlation matrix
tended toward singularity which suggests that for these specifications
all of the parameters of the model are not identified.In order to
ensureidentificationforall specificationsandtoallow
comparability of estimates across the different specificatipns, a
constrained version of the model was estimated where P12= P23•These
are the results that are presented here regardless of whether or not
theparticular specification had convergence problems in the
unconstrained version. It must be pointed out that the estimates of
the constrained version of the model were substantively identical to
the estimates of the unconstrained version and that the maximized log—
likelihood value was in no case more than .2 lower for the constrained
version.Of course, the standard statistical tests do not apply here
due to the fact that the estimates of the unconstrained model are on
the boundary of the parameter space.However, it does sugest
informally that the constraint does not alter thesubstantive
conclusions that can be drawn from the model.
The correlation constraint that was imposed has an interesting
andreasonablesubstantive interpretation. Essentially, theHenry S. Farber 36 RTW Laws and Unionization
constraint is that the correlation between the error in the worker
preference equation and the error in the employer hiringequation is
time invariant. This suggests that the underlying stochastic
structure can be written as an error components modelwith fixed




wheref1 represents a time invariant unobserved factor affecting
worker preferences for union representation and f2 represents a time
invariant unobserved factor affecting the employer hiring equation.22
The components w represent random factors that are uncorrelatedboth
with each other and with the f•.This correlation structure is
relatively flexible in that it allows for all of the u tobe
correlated without assuming perfect correlation or identity of any
pair of errors. A potential weakness of this specificationis that it
does not allow for within period correlation that does not persist
over time between the unobservables affecting worker preferencesand
the union employer hiring function.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the model are containedin
the first two columns of table 10. The estimates in the first column,
for G1, refer to the worker preference for union representation
function and the estimates can be interpreted directly as theeffect
of the relevant variable on worker preferences.With regard to the
estimates of the parameters of the union employer hiringfunction
(G2), note that the underlying model of theunion employer hiring
equation (equation 7) is specified so that largervalues of XG2 implyTable 10. Estimates of Trivariate Union Status Model
Quality of Employment Survey, 1977
Variable G1 -G2 -G2
Constant .681 1.12 .595 1.24
(.351) (1.18) (.327) (1.18)
NW .788 —.0805 .784 —.166
(.175) (.755) (.176) (.758)
Fe .241 —.255 .250 -.309
(.162) (.380) (.161) (.380)
Marr .0968 .304 .109 .310
(.143) (.223) (.140) (.243)
Marr*Fe —.212 .0836 —.261 .0750
(.199) (.365) (.196) (.402)
Ed<12 .0470 .126 .0489 .139
(.133) (.210) (.130) (.226)
12<Ed<16 —.124 —.121 —.133 —.137
(.122) (.218) (.122) (.235)
Ed>16 .172 .0859 .184 .0614 —
(.164) (.292) (.162) (.319)
Age —.0115 —.0129 —.0115 —.0126
(.00459) (.0102) (.00451) (.0117)
Sen —.0216 ——— —.0213
(.0177) (.0166)
Cler —.450 —.744 —.428 —.700
(.161) (.339) (.151) (.403)
Serv —.147 —.731 —.132 —735
(.161) (.268) (.155) (.271)
Prof&Tech —.426 —.508 —.415 —.452
(.163) (.381) (.159) (.435)
South —.0365 —.560 —.216 —.692















Note:The numbers in parentheses areasymptotic standard errors. n=915Henry S. Farber 37 RTW Laws and Unionization
that the worker has a lower probability of being hired by a union
employer. In order to make the interpretation of the parameters more
natural, the estimates of G2 are presented in the second column of
table 10 with their signs reversed. In this way the estimates can be
interpreted directly as the effect of the relevant variable on the
ability to be hired by a union employer.In other words, a positive
coefficient suggests that a worker with a larger value for the
associated variable will be more likely to be hired by a union
employer.
Once again the discussion will focus on the region and RTW
variables.The estimates of the other parameters are virtually
identical to those obtained by Farber (1983), and they are discussed
in more detail there.
With regard to the region and RTW variables the results are
substantively identical those obtained using the single equation
probits in the previous section. Southern workers have preferences
for union representation that are not significantly different from
those of nonsouthern workers after controlling for the presence of RTW
laws.At the same time worker preference for union representation is
significantly lower in RTW states. On the supply side, the
probability that a worker will be hired by a union employeris
significantly lower in the south and it is not significantlyaffected
by the RTW status of the state of residence.23
The estimates in the third and fourth columns of table 10 refer
to a model which is identical to the first model with the exception
that the RTW variable is omitted from both the worker preference and
the employer hiring criterion relationships.The results are veryHenry S. Farber 38 RTW Laws and Unionization
similar to those contained in the first two columns with the exception
that workers in the south appear to have a significantly lower
preference for union representation.This is due to the omitted RTW
variable which is correlated with the South variable.Using a
likelihood ratio test, the hypothesis that both RTW coefficients are
zero can be rejected at conventional levels of significance.24
IX. Implications for Right—to—Work Laws, Region, and Unionization
In order to examine examine the relationships of region and RTW
laws with the demand for and supply of unionization in more detail a
number of important guantities that can be derived from the model
estimated in the previous section must be defined. These include the
probability of a worker desiring union representation,
(13) Pr(DES=1) =Pr(u1>-XG1);
the probability that a worker will be hired by a union employer,
(14) Pr(HIRE=1) =Pr(u2<—XG2);
and the probability that a worker is unionized,
(15) Pr(U=1) =Pr(DES=1,HIRE=1)
=Pr(u1>-XG1,u2<-XG2).
A final quantity, used to measure the supply of union jobs relative to
demand, is the probability of being hired by a union employer
conditional on desiring a union job. This is
(16) Pr(HIRE=1IDES1) =Pr(U=1)/Pr(DES1).
Table 11 contains predicted probabilities, defined in equations
(13);(15); and (16),along with their approximate asymptotic
standard errors for the "standard" worker as they vary by region and
RTW status.25These probabilities are computed from the estimatesTable 11:
Predicted Probabilities and Differences in Probabilities:
Demand, Supply, and Union Status


























































Note: The numbers in parentheses are approximate asymptotic standard
errors derived from a first-order expansion of the relevant function,
defined in equations 13-16, around the estimated parameter values
contained in the first and second columns of table 10.All workers
are 30 year old white single males with 12 years education and no
seniority who are working in blue collar occupations.Henry S. Farber 39 RTW Laws and Unionization
contained in the first two columns of table 10.Also presented are
the differences in the probabilities by region and RTW statusalong
with the standard errors of the differences. These number allow the
formulation of more precise and valid conclusions regarding the
relationshipsbetween RTW laws, region,and theextentof
unionization.
Thedemand for union representation is summarized by the
probability that a worker desires union representation (Pr(DES=1)).
This is significantly higher in non-RTW states than in states with the
law.For the standard worker the difference in Pr(DES=1) associated
with RTW laws is approximately twelve precentage points. This is
approximately 20 percent of the level of this probability in non-RTW
states.Thus, it is concluded that RTW laws are associated with a
significantly and substantiallylowerdemand for union
representation.26No significant difference is found by region in
worker demand for union representation.
Movements in the suppiy of union jobs relative to demand are
summarized by movements in the probability that a worker is hired bya
unionemployerconditional ondesiringunionrepresentation
(Pr(HIRE=1JDES=1)).No significant difference is found in this
quantity between RTW states and non-RTW states. Thus, it is concluded
that there is no significant association between RTW laws and the
relative supply of union jobs.27 However, the results indicate that
workers in the south, regardless of the presence or absence of RTW
laws, face a significantly more constrained relative supply of union
jobs than do workers in the nonsouth.For the standard worker the
difference in Pr(HIRE=1IDES=1) associated with region is approximatelyHenry S. Farber 40 RTW Laws and Unionization
twenty percentage points. This is approximately 25 percent of the
value of this probability in nonsouthern states.Thus, the regional
differences in relative supply are both significant and substantial
even after controlling for the existence of RTW laws.
The relationships of region and RTW status with the ultimate
outcome, the probability of being unionized (Pr(U=1)), are consistent
with those found using the single equation probit model on both the
QES sample and the CPS sample.Essentially, both southern residence
and residence in a state with a RTW law areassociated with a
significantlyandsubstantiallylowerprobabilityofunion
representation.
What do these results suggest for the proposed empirical test of
the role of RTW laws? The pattern is quite clear, and it is supported
by the estimates derived using a variety of econometric specifications
and data sets. Right—to—Work laws are associated with a substantially
lowerdemand for union representation and asomewhatlarger
(approximately 3 percent) observed union—nonunion wage differential.
At the same time the supply of union jobs relative to demand is no
more constrained in RTW states than in non—RTW states.
This pattern of results is not consistent with the pure "free
rider" hypothesis which would yield no difference in demand, a more
constrained relative supply in RTW states, and a larger observed
union-nonunion wage differential in RTW states.Only the latter is
found.
The observed pattern of results is perfectly consistent with the
"tastes" hypothesis which suggests that RTW laws have no independent
effect but only mirror preferences of workers for nonunion employment.Henry S. Farber 41 RTW Laws arid Unionization
This would account for the lower demand for union representation in
RTW states as well as the lack of correlation with relative supplyand
the larger observed union—nonunion wage differential.
The finalhypothesis concerns the "strikeenforcability"
explanation.This hypothesis implies both the negative correlation
of RTW laws with the demand for union representation and the lack of
correlation of RTW laws with the relative supply of union jobs.On
the other hand, no systematic correlation of RTW laws with the
observedunion-nonunion wage differential is predicted by this
hypothesis.The fact that a significant positive correlation was
found would seem to rule out the "strike enforcability" hypothesis.
However, the observed union-nonunion wage differential wasfound to be
only slightly (3 percent), albeit significantly, largerin RTW states.
This may well have some other explanation which would make the
remaining evidence consistent with the hypothesis.28 Onthis basis
the "strike enforcability" hypothesis can only be tentatively ruled
out.
Given the difficulty in drawing inferences regarding the real
effects of any legislation (and RTW laws in particular) and the real
possibility that some combination of the hypothesesconsidered here
are at work, precise conclusions must be drawn extremelycarefully.
Nonetheless, the results found in this study are perfectly compatible
with the hypothesis that the observed inverse correlation between RTW
laws and the extent of unionization is due to workers in RTW states
having a preference for nonunion jobs rather than to adirect effect
of RTW laws. The results in their entirety are not compatiblewith
either of the competing hypotheses, both of which imply that RTW laws•Herty S. Farber 42 RTW Laws and Unionization
have a real effect on the extent of unionization. In other words the
results found in• this study, based on a careful examination of
variations in the demand for union representation; the relative supply
of union jobs; and the observed union—nonunion wage differential,
suggest that there is no causal link between RTW laws and the extent
of unionization.
This conclusion, when combined with the results found in this
study regarding the correlation between region and the extent of
unionization, sheds some (though not enough) light on the dilemma of
the relative lack of unionization in the south.The conclusion that
RTW laws have no real effect suggests that these laws cannot be blamed
for the low extent of unionization in the south.At the same time it
suggests that, since RTW laws are relatively common in the south,
there is somewhat less demand for union representation in many states
in that region.However, this cannot be the entire explanation
because the extent of unionization is significantly lower in the south
even after controlling for the presence of RTW laws.29 An additional
factor seems to be a supply of union jobs which is significantly more
constrained relative to demand in the south than outside that region.
The implication is that there exist a set of factors in the south
which make union organization more difficult and expensive than
elsewhere (e.g., greater employer resistance) independent of the
existence of RTW laws. The mystery of the relative lack of
unionization in the south remains to be solved, but the results
derived in this study provide some important clues.Henry S. Farber 43 RTW Laws and Unionization
Notes
1) Louisiana passed a RTW law which became effective in 1977. The
data used for the empirical analysis in this study refers to 1977.
Given that there is likely to be a lag between the enactment of the
law and any effects on the extent of unionization, for the purpose of
this analysis Louisiana is considered not to have a RTW law. Indiana
passed a RTW law in 1957 which was repealed in 1965.
2)Jones (1982) and Katz (1983) present evidence suggesting that the
duty of fair representation required by law is not completely
effective in practice.They find that union members who are covered
by a collective bargaining agreement receive a higher wage than
otherwise equivalent nonmembers who are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement.Katz also analyzes the decisions of workers
regarding whether to work on a nonunion job, work on a union job but
not become a union member, or work on a union job and become a member.
3) Katz (1983) presents evidence from the May 1979 CPS that 13.3
percent of workers in right—to-work states who were covered by a
collective bargaining agreement were not members of a labor union. In
contrast to this only 7.5 percent of workers in non—RTW states who
were covered by a collective bargaining agreement were not members of
a labor union.This suggests that the magnitude of the free rider
problem is more severe in RTW states.Note that even in non-RTW
states there is a free rider problem if a union is unable to negotiate
an appropriate union security clause with the employer.
4) Of course unions can influence the employment relationship in a
large number of dimensions.For example, unions may affect wages,
fringe benefits, turnover, mechanisms for handling disputes between
workers and employers, hours, safety, promotions, and job security.
Nevertheless, wages are a very important component of the compensation
package, they have been the focus of much research, and they can be
measured in a relatively straightforward fashion.See Freeman and
Medoff (1979b, 1981) for recent summaries of the differences between
union and nonunion jobs in a number of dimensions.
5) See note 4.
6) In some cases a struck employer will shut down his entire operation
even if some of workers are willing to continue working.However, in
other cases a struck employer does his best to continue operations and
is quite happy to utilize any workers who are willing to continue
working.
7) These same social sanctions may operate in a weaker fashion in
enforcing universal membership in the union in covered establishments.
To the extent that this is true, the general free rider problem caused
by RTW laws will not be important. However, the evidence presented in
note 3, regarding the relatively high proportion of noninembers in
covered employment in RTW states, suggests that at best these social
sanctions mitigate the free rider problem without eliminating it.Hery S. Farber 44 RTW Laws and Unionization
8) Given the large literature on "correcting"the uriion-noflufliofl wage
differential estimated using ordinary least squaresfor selectivity
bias, it is interesting to note that the empiricaltests proposed here
require uncorrected estimates of thedifferential. It is recognized
that the workers who are unionized in RTW states arein part self—
selected on the basis of relative earnings, butthe results of this
self—selection process are exactly what the tests arebased on. The
difference in approach is due to the differencein goals between the
pure wage studies andthis study.While this study attempts to
analyze the effects of RTW laws, the wagestudies generally have as
their goal the measurement of the effect ofunions on wages of
particularworkersas distinct from theunion-nonunionwage
differential. See Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972), Lee (1978),Schmidt
and Strauss (1976), and Freeman and Medoff (1981)for discussions of
selectivity bias correction in the context of estimatingthe effects
of unions on wages.
9) The normalization that the variance of e equalsone is required to
fix the scale of B, and it is a standard assumptionin implementing
discrete choice models of the sort proposed here.
10) Models of this sort have been implementedby Lee (1978) and
by Schmidt and Strauss (1976).
11) Since the terms and conditionsof employment are determined by
collective bargaining coverage rather than byunion membership,it
might be more reasonable to concentrate onthat measure here.
However, information on coverage is notavailable in the May 1977 CPS.
It is available in the QES and will be usedin analyzing those data.
See notes 2 and 3 for related points.Freeemafl and Medoff (1979a)
present an analysis of data fromvarious sources which highlight the
distinctions between membership and coverage.
12) See, for example, Bloch andKuskin (1976); Freeman (1980); and
Abowd and Farber (1982).
13) The analysis in this section is adaptedfrom the model developed
by Farber (1983).
14)This analysis is not applicable to industries, such as
construction, where hiring is controlled by theunion through a hiring
hail.Workers in such industries have beenexcluded from the
theoretical and empirical analyses throughout.
15) Raisian (1981) investigates theissue of the magnitude of union
dues relative to the union—nonunion wagedifferential.
16) The particular set of institutionsdescribed here refer to private
sector nonagricultural and nonmanagerialworkers in the Unites States
whoare covered by the NationalLabor Relations Act (NLRA).
Organization of workers not covered bythe NERA proceeds along
different, but equally costly and uncertain,lines.Henry S. Farber 45 RTW Laws and Unionization
17) It is possible for union jobs to revertto nonunion status through
a NLRBSuperV1Sed decertificationelection. However, these are
relatively rare and can safely be ignoredin this analysis. For
example, according to the NLRB (1979), duringfiscal 1979 7266
certification elections involving 538,404 workers were officially
decided while only 777 decertification elections involving39,538
workers were officially decided.
18) See Quinn and Staines (1979) for adetailed description of the
survey design.
19)The interpretation of the nonunion seniorityvariable is
complicated by the possibility that workerswith a lot of nonunion
senioritymayhave that seniority because of anunmeasured
predispositiontoward nonunion employment rather thannonunion
seniority being an independent causal factorin determining worker
preferences for union representation.
20) Given the nonlinearity in thenormal probability function,
references to statistical significance of probabilitydifferences on
the basis of the standard error of a singlecoefficient estimate are
not strictly correct.All of the claims made here have been verified
using a first order approximation to therelevant function computed
for a "standard" worker as a basis for computingthe correct standard
errors for inferences about probabilitydifferences.Some of these
prObabilities with estimatedstandard errors are presented below in
the context of the trivariate model inorder to investigate the
magnitude of the effects of region and RTWlaws.
21) Note that the signs arereversed so that the results can be
interpreted naturally as a larger value of —H yields alarger value of
Pr(HIRE1).Thus, the estimated parameters are -G2.This is due to
the fact that Pr(HIRE1) is an inversefunction of H as defined in
equation (7).
22) Recall that u1 and u3 representunmeasured factors that affect
worker preferences for union representationwith the former at the
time the worker started his current job andthe latter at current
time.
23) It is important to note that thisis not the probability of being
hired by a union employer conditional on desiring aunion job, but it
is the probability of being hired by a union employerfor the randomly
selected worker. The relevant conditional probability will be
computed and discussed below.
24) The relevant test statistic is —2(—897.3(892.8))
=9.0.This is
distributed as chi—square with two degrees of freedom.The critical
value of this distribution at the .025 levelis 7.38.
25) The standard worker is a 30 yearold white single male with 12
years education who is workingin a blue collar occupation and who has
no seniority.Heiiry S Farber 46 RTW Lows and Unionization
26) While the results are not presented here,the model was
reestimated including variables for the interaction between South and
RTW in both XG1 and XG2 in order to account for the possibility that
RTW laws may be different in the South than elsewhere.The results
were virtually unchanged, and the hypothesis that the two parameters
associated with the interaction variables are zero cannot be rejected
at any reasonable level of significance.Neither the magnitude nor
thestatistical significance of the estimated coefficients was
affected in any meaningful way by the interaction variables.
27) The results with regard to relative supply are unaffected by the
inclusion of variables for the interaction between South and RTW. See
note 26.
28)Such an explanation might be that either the "tastes" hypothesis
or the "free rider" hypothesis have some amount of validity without
being the dominant factor.
29) The evidence cited in note 26 makes it clear that this cannot be
the result of RTW laws in the south being associated with more
antiunion feeling than is associated with RTW laws generally.Henry S. Farber 47 RTWLawsand Unionization
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